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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3092 
 ___________ 
 
 EZZIE MCINTYRE, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 COUNTY OF CENTRE; KAREN ARNOLD; Judge CHARLES BROWN, JR. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
 (D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-02014) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Edwin M. Kosik 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 13, 2011 
 Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: February 11, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Ezzie McIntyre appeals pro se from the dismissal of his amended complaint and 
denial of his motion for reconsideration.  For the following reasons, we will summarily 
affirm. 
I. 
2 
 
 On April 12, 1999, McIntyre pled guilty to robbery and was sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum of five to ten years of incarceration.  In March 2000, he filed a 
petition seeking post-conviction relief, asserting that his plea was invalid.  The PCRA 
court appointed Amy Burd to represent McIntyre but, due to her failure to amend 
McIntyre’s petition or file a brief on his behalf, the proceeding was delayed.  McIntyre 
received a new attorney in April 2007, who successfully litigated McIntyre’s petition.  
On December 13, 2007, the PCRA court permitted McIntyre to withdraw his plea.  He 
thereafter entered a new guilty plea and was sentenced to three-and-a-half to seven years 
incarceration, with credit given for the time already served.1
On October 15, 2009, McIntyre filed his pro se complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, against Centre County; Karen Arnold, the assistant district attorney who prosecuted 
his case; and Judge Charles Brown, Jr., the judge who sentenced him.  He subsequently 
amended his complaint, adding as defendants Ronald McGlaughlin, the attorney 
appointed to represent him at his initial sentencing, and Burd.
   
2
Although it is not entirely clear from McIntyre’s filings, it appears that Brown, 
Arnold, and McGlaughlin all believed that 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9712, which 
imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of five years on a person who visibly possesses 
a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, applied to McIntyre even though 
   
                                                 
1 Although McIntyre completed his sentence on the robbery offense, a search of public 
records reveals that he was again incarcerated after pleading guilty to a February 2008 
assault.   
 
2 Since the amended complaint suggested that McIntyre sought damages from 
McGlaughlin and Burd, the District Court construed it as adding those two individuals as 
defendants.  We will do the same. 
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it did not.  It therefore appears that McIntyre’s plea was invalid because he had been 
misinformed as to the range of permissible sentences applicable to his case.  According to 
McIntyre, by the time the error was corrected, he had served almost nine years on the 
initial improper sentence.  He therefore sought monetary damages as a result of his 
“illegal plea,” “illegal sentence,” and McGlaughlin and Burd’s ineffective assistance.       
 The District Court dismissed McIntyre’s amended complaint pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  The District Court first concluded that the claims were likely 
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because “any award would seemingly 
imply the invalidity of [McIntyre’s] conviction and sentence on the same underlying 
robbery charges.”  Regardless, the District Court found that the suit was subject to 
dismissal because none of the individual defendants was amenable to a § 1983 suit for 
damages.3
The District Court possessed jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 & 1343.  Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Since McIntyre’s timely 
appeal from the denial of his motion for reconsideration “brings up the underlying 
judgment for review,” we will review the District Court dismissal of the amended 
complaint as well as its denial of the motion for reconsideration.  N. River Ins. Co. v. 
CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995).  We may summarily affirm 
if no substantial question is presented by the appeal, see 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. IOP 
  McIntyre filed a timely motion for reconsideration, which District Court 
denied.  McIntyre then timely appealed. 
II. 
                                                 
3 The District Court did not specifically address Centre County’s liability. 
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10.6, and may affirm on any ground supported by the record.  Berardi v. Swanson Mem’l 
Lodge No. 48, 920 F.2d 198, 201-02 (3d Cir. 1990). 
We doubt the correctness of the District Court’s conclusion that McIntyre’s claims 
are barred by Heck, since a damages award for the excess amount of time McIntyre 
served on his initial improper sentence does not necessarily imply the invalidity of his 
subsequent conviction and sentence.  However, we will nevertheless summarily affirm 
because the individual defendants are not amenable to suit under § 1983 and McIntyre 
has failed to state a claim against Centre County.  
Brown and Arnold are entitled to absolute immunity because McIntyre seeks 
damages from them based upon actions taken by Brown in his judicial capacity and by 
Arnold while she was acting as the Commonwealth’s advocate in a criminal proceeding.   
See Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 377 n.15 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[A] prosecutor is 
absolutely immune [from a § 1983 suit seeking damages] when acting as an advocate in 
judicial proceedings.”); Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(“[J]udges are immune from suit under section 1983 for monetary damages arising from 
their judicial acts.”).  McGlaughlin and Burd are likewise not subject to § 1983 liability 
because they are not state actors.  See Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309, 314 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(court appointed defense counsel in criminal proceedings does not act under color of state 
law), abrogation on other grounds recognized by, D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area 
Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1368 n.7 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Polk Cnty. 
v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981). 
Finally, McIntyre fails to state a claim against Centre County because he did not 
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allege that the constitutional violations of which he complains stemmed from an official 
policy or custom of the county.  See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 
658, 694 (1978).  Instead, McIntyre’s amended complaint and his other submissions 
illustrate that he seeks to impose respondeat superior liability on Centre County.  Such a 
claim is not cognizable under § 1983.  Id. (“[A] local government may not be sued under 
§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.”).  Since McIntyre’s § 
1983 lawsuit clearly fails against all of the defendants, he has not presented a substantial 
question for review.  We will therefore summarily affirm the dismissal of his amended 
complaint.4
                                                 
4 We will also affirm the District Court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration.  In that 
motion, McIntyre, in response to the District Court’s observation that a legal malpractice 
suit was the proper remedy against his attorneys, explained that he had in fact filed such a 
suit but that the state court – incorrectly in his opinion – dismissed the suit as untimely 
and frivolous.  He also specified which of his constitutional rights he believed to have 
been violated by the defendants’ conduct, adding allegations that his sentence was the 
product of race discrimination.  The District Court correctly recognized that it was 
without authority to review the state court’s rulings and that McIntyre’s additional 
allegations did not affect its prior ruling.   
  
 
 
